63 ideas
| 10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
| 10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
| 18074 | Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher] |
| 6298 | Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik] |
| 12392 | Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher] |
| 18078 | The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher] |
| 12426 | The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher] |
| 12395 | Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher] |
| 12425 | Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher] |
| 18071 | A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher] |
| 18066 | The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher] |
| 18083 | With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher] |
| 18061 | Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher] |
| 12420 | If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher] |
| 12393 | Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher] |
| 12387 | Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher] |
| 12412 | My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher] |
| 18065 | We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher] |
| 18077 | The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher] |
| 12423 | Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher] |
| 18069 | Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher] |
| 18068 | Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher] |
| 18070 | We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher] |
| 18072 | Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher] |
| 18063 | Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher] |
| 18064 | If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher] |
| 18067 | Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher] |
| 10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| 12390 | A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher] |
| 12418 | In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher] |
| 12389 | Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher] |
| 12416 | We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher] |
| 12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
| 20473 | If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo] |
| 10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
| 10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
| 10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
| 10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
| 10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
| 10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
| 10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
| 10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
| 10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
| 10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
| 10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
| 10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
| 10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
| 18075 | Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher] |
| 10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
| 10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
| 10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
| 6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
| 10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
| 10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |