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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth' and 'The Elm and the Expert'

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80 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
An explicit definition enables the elimination of what is defined [Halbach]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Any definition of truth requires a metalanguage [Halbach]
Traditional definitions of truth often make it more obscure, rather than less [Halbach]
If people have big doubts about truth, a definition might give it more credibility [Halbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
CT proves PA consistent, which PA can't do on its own, so CT is not conservative over PA [Halbach]
Axiomatic truth doesn't presuppose a truth-definition, though it could admit it at a later stage [Halbach]
The main semantic theories of truth are Kripke's theory, and revisions semantics [Halbach]
To axiomatise Tarski's truth definition, we need a binary predicate for his 'satisfaction' [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT has the truth of a sentence depending of the semantic values of its constituents [Halbach]
Gödel numbering means a theory of truth can use Peano Arithmetic as its base theory [Halbach]
Truth axioms need a base theory, because that is where truth issues arise [Halbach]
We know a complete axiomatisation of truth is not feasible [Halbach]
A theory is 'conservative' if it adds no new theorems to its base theory [Halbach, by PG]
The Tarski Biconditional theory TB is Peano Arithmetic, plus truth, plus all Tarski bi-conditionals [Halbach]
Theories of truth are 'typed' (truth can't apply to sentences containing 'true'), or 'type-free' [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
Friedman-Sheard is type-free Compositional Truth, with two inference rules for truth [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
The KF theory is useful, but it is not a theory containing its own truth predicate [Halbach]
The KF is much stronger deductively than FS, which relies on classical truth [Halbach]
Kripke-Feferman theory KF axiomatises Kripke fixed-points, with Strong Kleene logic with gluts [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
In Strong Kleene logic a disjunction just needs one disjunct to be true [Halbach]
In Weak Kleene logic there are 'gaps', neither true nor false if one component lacks a truth value [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Every attempt at formal rigour uses some set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
The underestimated costs of giving up classical logic are found in mathematical reasoning [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A theory is some formulae and all of their consequences [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
You cannot just say all of Peano arithmetic is true, as 'true' isn't part of the system [Halbach]
Normally we only endorse a theory if we believe it to be sound [Halbach]
Soundness must involve truth; the soundness of PA certainly needs it [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Many new paradoxes may await us when we study interactions between frameworks [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach]
The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Maybe necessity is a predicate, not the usual operator, to make it more like truth [Halbach]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank]