16 ideas
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |