12 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
10009 | Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
17402 | Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
17399 | Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev] |
17400 | Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
17401 | Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev] |