Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Elements of Being: I', 'Philosophies of Mathematics' and 'Parerga and Paralipomena'

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman]
Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman]
The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman]
'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman]
A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman]
The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman]
The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman]
Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman]
Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman]
Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman]
Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer]
The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer]
Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer]