Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Elements of Being: I', 'Epistemic Norms' and 'Subjective and Objective'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8508 A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
8509 A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
8510 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3296 Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3295 Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3292 The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3294 As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]