Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Elements of Being: I', 'Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance' and 'Purple Haze'

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8508 A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
8509 A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
8510 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
7876 Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
7877 Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
7878 Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
13964 Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]