Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Elements of Being: I', 'Apriority and Existence' and 'Truthmakers'

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30 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8859 The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
8865 If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
8863 We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
8862 Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
8864 We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8508 A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
8509 A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
8510 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8858 Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
8861 Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]