53 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
7469 | There is no hereafter in the Book of Job [Anon (Job), by Watson] |