15 ideas
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 1466 | Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG] |
| 1465 | You can't claim a patch of land is tended by a 'gardener' if there is no evidence, and all counter-evidence is rejected [Flew, by PG] |
| 1467 | Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence that God does not love us, so their claim is unfalsifiable [Flew, by PG] |