54 ideas
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 1708 | In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 1703 | It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle] |
| 1704 | Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle] |
| 22272 | Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle] |
| 9405 | Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle] |
| 9728 | Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9729 | Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9730 | Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9731 | Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9732 | Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9733 | Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 21593 | In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson] |
| 1701 | A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 1706 | Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle] |
| 1707 | Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
| 2337 | For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam] |
| 13763 | Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle] |
| 1705 | It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 1702 | Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle] |