12 ideas
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 3916 | Hopi consistently prefers verbs and events to nouns and things [Whorf] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 3917 | Scientific thought is essentially a specialised part of Indo-European languages [Whorf] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 3915 | The Hopi have no concept of time as something flowing from past to future [Whorf] |