59 ideas
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |