23 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |