Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
8868 Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
16489 Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16490 Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
8867 A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
16488 It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
8866 If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
10346 Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
16491 If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
4786 Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]