12 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8386 | Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8387 | A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties [Crane] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 8384 | The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved [Crane] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |