13 ideas
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |