63 ideas
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |