17 ideas
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |