17 ideas
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |