Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', 'Possible Worlds' and 'Understanding and Essence'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
19259 If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
8868 Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
19262 Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
19267 Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
19268 Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19265 Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
8867 A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19260 Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]
19266 In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
8866 If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
10346 Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
19264 Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]