91 ideas
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |