86 ideas
11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |