19 ideas
17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |