Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Individuation of Events', 'The Unimportance of Identity' and 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed)'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
18914 Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
9843 You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
14602 Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
14004 We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8278 The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
18076 Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
22191 Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
22183 Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
6162 Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
22184 Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
7619 Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]