48 ideas
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
8500 | Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |