15 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |