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All the ideas for 'Truth and Predication', 'Human, All Too Human' and 'Real Essentialism'

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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche]
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche]
Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche]
Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche]
Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche]
The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche]
Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche]
Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche]