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All the ideas for 'Truth and Predication', 'Dawn (Daybreak)' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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107 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]