25 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |