15 ideas
| 19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
| 19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
| 19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
| 19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
| 19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
| 19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
| 19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
| 19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
| 19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |