Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Meaning', 'Externalism/Internalism' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23633 Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
23630 Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
23629 The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
23632 Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]