18 ideas
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 10246 | The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl] |