48 ideas
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |