12 ideas
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
| 2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
| 6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
| 2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |