47 ideas
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |