Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Individuation of Events', 'Counting and the Natural Numbers' and 'Material Constitution'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha]
Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]