20 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |