62 ideas
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
10710 | We accept substance, to avoid infinite backwards chains of meaning [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |