16 ideas
| 9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
| 17423 | The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha] |
| 9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
| 17425 | To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha] |
| 17424 | Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha] |
| 9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
| 9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
| 9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
| 9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
| 9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |