11 ideas
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |