Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', 'Lysis' and 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
8868 Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
8867 A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
10347 Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
8866 If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
10346 Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
295 The good is beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
294 People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]