16 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 19378 | Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 19380 | Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |