Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thought and Talk', 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda' and 'Intending'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6396 A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
11145 Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
6397 The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
6392 Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
6393 A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
11144 Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]