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All the ideas for 'Truth and Meaning', 'Four Dimensionalism' and 'What is Philosophy?'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]