93 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
14415 | A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks] |
14408 | Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks] |
14395 | If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks] |
14403 | If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks] |
14398 | Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
14396 | If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks] |
14400 | If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks] |
14394 | It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks] |
14390 | Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks] |
14412 | Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks] |
14414 | I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks] |
14418 | Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks] |
14391 | If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks] |
14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
14393 | The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14413 | Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14416 | An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14392 | Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
14410 | You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14417 | Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks] |
14402 | If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14407 | Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks] |
14411 | Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
14406 | Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks] |
14405 | How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks] |