15 ideas
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |