75 ideas
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |