25 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |