Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Relations', 'Mathematical Logic (revised)' and 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
18739 Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18741 Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12221 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
19321 We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18744 Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
8348 If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
18745 A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18747 The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
18748 Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18746 Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
18750 Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10371 Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
4778 A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]